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Summary 
The purpose of this paper is to propose hybrid capital securities as a new approach to 
compensation for senior bank executives and risk-takers instead of cash or equity-based 
compensation currently adopted by the industry. The global financial turmoil indicated that 
misaligned pay-for-performance compensation arrangements encouraged management short-
termism and rewarded excessive risk-taking behaviour in Anglo-Saxon system. Rather than 
regulating specific instruments and processes, we believe that it is much more efficient to 
overhaul the compensation scheme to align it with risk management and governance. This 
empirical paper investigates the European hybrid market by employing data from the Merrill 
Lynch Global Index System from 2000 to 2010.  Our paper contributes to both literature and 
practices by designing a structured scheme to tie the executive’s interests to long-term 
performance of the bank, the goal of regulators and the economy at large which consequently 








The study of executive compensation has attracted great interests from academics, 
businesses, regulators as well as the general public over the past several years, especially in 
the wake of the global financial crisis sparked in 2007. Although causes of the financial 
turmoil are multidimensional, misaligned compensation arrangements that encouraged 
management short-termism have been blamed for the failure of high profile companies such 
as Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S. The financial 
regulators blame those who devised pay-for-performance incentive schemes, which 
encouraged and rewarded short-term and excessive risk-taking behaviour (Miller 2008). 
Bebchuk et al. (2010) indicate that the top-five executive teams of Bear Sterns and Lehman 
Brothers cashed out large amounts of performance-based compensation in the form of cash 
bonus and equity sales during 2000-2008. Shareholders are highly concerned with rewards 
for failure as executives walked away with large pay packets even when the stock market 
collapsed.    
Pay for performance compensation scheme which links executive pay with stock price 
has been an important feature of executive contracts in Anglo-Saxon system prevailing in the 
U.S./U.K. (Murphy 2003; Benmelech, Kandel et al. 2010). Agency theory promotes the use 
of management shared ownership via equity compensation to ensure managers make 
decisions in the best interest of the company. Despite the argument that equity compensation 
has shown strong association with managerial performance, providing a solution to an agency 
problem between shareholders and managers, a large amount of academic debates have 
drawn attention to the danger of equity based compensation structure that might lead to 
earning manipulation, excessive risk taking and fraudulent schemes (Goldman and Slezak 
2006; Crocker and Slemrod 2007). Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) argue that equity-based 
awards, associated with the capital structure of banks, link executives’ compensation to a 
highly levered bet on the value of banks’ assets. Such behaviour is further encouraged by the 
overly complicated compensation schemes, which enable executives to benefit from 
excessive risk taking, while limit downside risk to a minimum.   
 Our paper does not put its concentration on whether cash or equity-based 
compensation amplifies the agency problem. Instead, the primary aim of the paper is to 
identify an alternative compensation scheme, which is believed to be best structured to tie the 
executive’s interests to long-term performance of the company and its shareholders. We 
propose that hybrid capital securities should be a significant part of the variable incentive 
compensation of senior bank executives and risk-takers. Recipients of hybrid capital 
securities should not be allowed to sell their securities before maturity. In this regard, the 
scheme contributes to reducing incentives towards excessive risk taking, helping to align the 
incentives of bank executives with the goals of bank regulators and the economy at large and 
thus reducing the probability of future bank failures.   
Pay-For-Performance Compensation and Global Financial Crisis 
In light of the financial crisis that started in 2007, it is widely accepted that bank regulation 
has been ineffective in managing systemic risk and preserving financial stability.  The crisis 
emerged because of the failure of both investors and rating agencies to recognise the 
complexity and financial risk that had built up in the financial system through the 
development of asset-backed securities (ABS) and collateralised debt obligation (CDOs). The 
public debate on regulation has revolved around some basic questions. Was the regulatory 
system fundamentally flawed?  How could changes in regulation prevent future crises?  Were 
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regulators themselves asleep on the job? The current financial crisis provides evidence on the 
limited ability of financial regulators to manage systemic risk. The causes are 
multidimensional. Firstly, the complexity of the financial derivative instruments, which were 
developed to profit from the real estate market in the U.S., has gone beyond the capacity of 
regulators to evaluate.  Secondly, we note the impunity with which those institutions and 
individuals who breached the regulatory framework were able to behave and extricate 
themselves.  The question is whether key decision-makers in large financial conglomerates 
who originate and acquire these derivative products would change their approach if they will 
not be easily escaped adverse consequences.  We believe that, rather than regulating specific 
instruments and processes, it is much more efficient to overhaul the compensation practices 
that we believe significantly contributed to the crises. The compensation schemes in the 
financial industry have been viewed as largely unrelated to risk management and risk 
governance. One of the consequences was that high short-term profits led to generous bonus 
payments to bank employees without adequate regard to the longer-term risks they imposed 
on their firms.  Any revised compensation packages after the crisis of 2007 should meet the 
aim of The FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (2009) to ensure effective 
governance of compensation, arrangement of compensation in relation to prudent risk-taking 
and effective supervisory oversight, and stakeholder engagement in compensation.   
Literature Review  
The concept of corporate governance is initially pointed out by Adam Smith (1776) based on 
the work The Wealth of Nations. He observes the possible danger connected to the diffusion 
of stock companies by the lack of incentive for both the owners and managers to manage and 
control the enterprise efficiently and effectively. Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose the 
agency theory that defines the agency relationship as a contract under which one party (the 
principal) engages another party (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf. Agency 
problem arises when the agents (managers) do not necessarily make decisions in the best 
interest of the principal (shareholders) (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In order to reduce the 
divergences of interests between managers and shareholders, two complementary 
mechanisms -- monitoring and incentives have been designed with the aim to prevent 
financial damage that can arise due to potential conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Incentives via executive 
compensation schemes take a number of different forms such as salaries, bonuses, 
recruitment incentives, stock options, equity ownership, or pension benefits (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). Agency theory predicts that 
compensation such as stock options can be the standard solution for inducing risk-seeking 
behaviour because of their payoff function (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Smith and Stulz 
1985). The overall purpose of these incentives is to place the managers in a position 
congruent with the economic interests of the enterprise as a whole.   
 
Theoretically, the study of executive compensation can be divided into two competing 
views: optimal contracting view and managerial power view (Bebchuk and Fried 2005; 
Weisbach 2007; Choe, Tian et al. 2009; Bebchuk, Cohen et al. 2010; Bebchuk and Weisbach 
2010; Sun, Zhao et al. 2010).  Optimal contracting anticipates that remuneration committees 
have sufficient incentives to determine executive compensation that optimizes on behalf of 
shareholders (Mirrlees 1976; Holmstrom 1979) Structural variables such as board 
composition and characteristics are insignificant or relevant. In contract, managerial power 
view believes that optimal contracting originally designed to help remedy agency problems 
may have actually become part of the problems because board structure is inefficient due to 
unresolved agency problems, leading to sub-optimal outcomes (Bebchuk and Fried 2003). It 
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is believed that executives may exert enormous influence over the board of director to make 
such pay arrangement in favour of themselves instead of the shareholders. There has been 
considerable concern about the contractual terms associated with the compensation of top 
executives, in particular, in the form of profit-related bonus, share options and termination 
payments when contract are ended (often when the performance of the company has been 
poor) (Lee 2006). According to Frey and Osterloh (2005), the performance-pay relation 
might be a misleading indicator of the compensation arrangements, which are difficult to 
implement and encourage risk behaviour in very short-term period.  
 
The empirical evidence on the relationship between pay and performance is mixed. In 
most empirical studies, various variables such as firm size, sales growth, CEO duality and 
ownership structure have been taken to study the performance-pay relation. The studies by 
Murphy (1985), Antle and Smith (1986), Jensen and Murphy (1990) document the evidence 
of a statistically significant association between total compensation (cash and share options) 
and share price performance. For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) identify that stock 
options offer the stronger basis for strengthening the performance-pay link than other pay 
components by analyzing the pay structure of 1688 executives’ compensation between 1974 
and 1986. Murphy (1985) highlights the importance of building a comprehensive pay 
variable from the analysis of 461 individuals in 72 US firms during 1964-1981. According to 
Hall and Murphy (2003), stock-based compensation, such as restricted stock and stock 
options, help align managerial and shareholder interests and motivate shareholder wealth 
creation. By contrast, scholars such as Gregg et al (1993) and Conyon and Gregg (1994) find 
a decreasing relationship between share price performance and executive pay. However, 
these studies fail to incorporate share options into the pay variable. It is argued that share 
options did little to address agency problem but offered executives an opportunity to take 
excessive risk in order bolster company’s share price with short-term maneuvers and gain 
significant reward without having to bear any downside risks. A study by Sawers et al. (2007) 
is based on the behavioural agency model, which predicts that managerial risk-seeking 
behaviour will be influenced by the manager’s wealth in stock-based compensation. The 
results suggest that the subjective overvaluation of stock options based on historical rising 
stock price trends increases risk-bearing behaviour.  
 
Development Plan 
The paper will be further developed to incorporate the literature review of the uniqueness of 
the compensation arrangements in banking industry due to the fact that banks are highly 
leveraged, equity-based incentive pay is prevailing and creditors in the form of insured 
depositors by government do not have incentives to monitor banks’ risk taking behaviour. 
The main characteristics of hybrid bank capital securities will then be analysed and followed 
by the investigation of European hybrid market by employing hybrid data from the Merrill 
Lynch Global Index System from 2000 to 2010.  We outline the evolution of the European 
market for hybrid bank capital securities and discuss the reasons for its remarkable growth. 
Furthermore, we will investigate investors’ experience with these securities before and after 
the Great Credit Crisis. The risk-return trade-off relationships from 2000 to 2010 will be 
estimated. According to our empirical analyses, we will put forward and lay out the rationale 
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